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This thesis develops a combat sustainability analysis which examines the effective-
ness of the H-60 and V-22 in conducting assault support operations once ashore. An
analytical model, represented as a finite state Markov chain in conjunction with first step
analysis, is employed. Several measures of effectiveness are evaluated: survivability,
productivity, and the build up of combat power. Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM DEFINITION.
From Iwo Jima, during WWII, to Grenada in 1983, the U.S Marine Corps has been
required to "hit the beach!". The Marine Corps still has capability to conduct amphibi-
ous assaults, that is, the landing of an Air-Ground Task Force against hostile shores.
However, a large part of this mission, the air transport of troops and equipment, is being
accomplished using "tired" medium assault helicopters. The aging CH-46 helicopter
needs to be replaced.
The use of assault support aircraft provides a means of rapidly deploying forces
ashore, avoiding the threat when possible, and redeploying forces to meet the threat
during subsequent operations ashore. Once ashore, the Air Combat Element of the as-
sault force will be expected to carry out the following types of missions in support of the
Ground Combat Element: assault, resupply, reconnaissance, search and rescue, and
medevac. Until recently, the only platform that provided the ability to accomplish this
myriad of missions was the helicopter. Today, technology has provided another alter-
native which provides this integral VSTOL (vertical/ short takeoff and landing) capabil-
ity, the tilt rotor, MV-22 Osprey.
Numerous analyses have been performed to assist in the determination of the even-
tual replacement of the CH-46. In this thesis, a combat sustainability analysis is initi-
ated to determine whether the V-22 is necessary to support and sustain the Marine
Corps operations in the mid range period 1995-2010, [Ref. 1 ]. The two alternatives to
be considered in the analysis include the H-60 Blackhawk and the V-22 Osprey.
The Blackhawk is a conventional helicopter currently in service in the fleet, primarily
being used by the Navy for ASW (antisubmarine warfare), and by the Army for troop
transport. When transporting 12 passengers, or 6300 pounds of cargo, it has a combat
radius of approximately 110 nautical miles. Some advantages of choosing the
Blackhawk alternative include low cost of the airframe, timeliness of delivery since the
aircraft is still in production, and the added flexibility afforded the commander due to
the greater number of aircraft available. Disadvantages include the greater numbers re-
quired to provide the same amount of lift, as well as the associated increases in required
support: maintenance, supply, and pilots.
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor aircraft. Its wing tip mounted engines and prop-rotor
systems rotate, allowing it to take ofTand land like a helicopter and once airborne fly like
a modern turbo-prop aircraft. The Osprey will transport 24 passengers or 8000 pounds
of cargo with a combat radius of 320 nautical miles. Significant advantages will be seen
in lift, range, and noise reduction. The greatest advantage to to be attained will be in-
creased speed. The V-22 will be capable of cruising at 250 knots, compared to the
Blackhawk's 130 knots. These improvements in overall system characteristics are an-
ticipated to be reflected in decreased system vulnerability and increased system
survivability. Potential disadvantages include the risks associated with new technology,
the greater cost per airframe, the timeliness consideration imbedded in the acquisition
process, and, finally, the significant degradation of the capability of the Air Combat El-
ement due to the loss of one of these aircraft.
B. OVERVIEW.
This thesis will present a combat model suitable for conducting the required combat
sustainability analysis. Chapter II develops an analytical model, for a reduced version
of the given problem, using a Markov chain and first step analysis. An analytical model,
rather than a large scale simulation, is appropriate for this analysis since the V-22 is
currently a proposed system and the detailed data required for a high resolution model
do not exist. Additionally, to adequately determine an alternative's combat effectiveness,
based on its characteristics, extensive sensitivitv analvsis should be conducted. This de-
sired sensitivity analysis is more easily accomplished with an analytical model than with
a large scale simulation. Chapter III applies the model to the real problem.
Specific measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to be addressed in the sustainability
analysis include the build up of combat power, sustainability, and the productivity of the
assault support assets. The MOEs are designed to present some measure of combat ef-
fectiveness attributable to each alternative.
Chapter IV presents sensitivity analysis conducted by varying three different pa-
rameters: detection probability, maintainability, and survivability. The results, discussed
in Chapter V, reflect the greater capability possessed by the V-22 in terms of the selected
MOEs and suggest additional factors for consideration.
II. METHODOLOGY
An analysis of replacement aircraft is required, with alternatives and MOEs basically
determined. The remaining challenge is to develop the appropriate model to be employed
for this analysis. There are numerous types of combat models used for research and
training; field exercises, wargames, and mathematical models are but a few. Based on the
specific model, mathematical models may either high or low in resolution, and either
stochastic or deterministic in nature.
The following is a list of several model properties, prepared by the Army Models
Review Committee [Ref. 2: p. 7], which should be considered in model development, and














Sensitivity of the model
Technical user capability
Visibility to the user
Establishment of an appropriate weapons procurement model considers additional
factors as well. The use of many models requires extensive knowledge of the weapon's
characteristics as reflected in the data base. These data can be acquired from develop-
mental or operational test and evaluation, high resolution models, historical data, etc.
When developing a new weapon system utilizing new technology like the V-22, these
data do not exist. Therefore, the development of expensive, highly detailed models in-
corporating specific probability distributions is premature. Thus the ability to conduct
extensive sensitivity analysis on several parameters rapidly is essential because of the
numerous uncertainties of the future system. Additionally an overall model goal is
robustness, which reflects a wide range of conditions over which the model is effective.
This thesis presents such a model by developing a particular Semi-Markov Process.
Specifically, let {Xn } be a discrete time Markov chain with states labeled 0,1, ... , N. The
states r, r+ 1, ... , N are absorbing states. The states 0, ... , r-1 are transient. Let Ptj be




where Q is an (r x r) matrix of transition probabilities, R is an r x (N-r) matrix of tran-
sition probabilities, O is a (N-r) x r matrix of zeros and I is an (N-r) x (N-r) identity
matrix. Let = T < T
x
< T2 < ... < Tn < ... be a sequence of random times with
P{Tn+l — Tn <t\Tx , ..., Tn , X , Xx , ...,Xn , Xn+l ) = P{Tn+l — Tn < t\ Xn , Xn+] ]
and put
F
ip) = P{Tn+,-Tn <t\Xn = i,Xn+,=j}
Let }'"(/) = X
n
if T„ < t < rnJ.j then {)'*(/); t > 0} is an example of a semi-Markov process.
With this structure in place, several questions can now be answered utilizing first
step analysis. What is the probability of absorption for a specific absorbing state? What
is the mean time to absorption? What is the mean number of visits to a transient state
prior to absorption? This same theory applied to the specific problem of interest yields
a very robust model capable of providing a multitude of information for use in analysis.
In order to demonstrate the developing methodology a small example (a reduced
version of the larger problem to be discussed in Chapter III) is presented. This example
models an aircraft based ashore with the mission of resupplying ground units.located at
various landing zones (LZ)s, upon request. Questions of interest include: How long will
the aircraft survive? What is the probability of aircraft loss due to pilot error? What is
the probability of aircraft loss due to catastrophic failure? How many times is the air-
craft expected to resupply an LZ prior to absorption? There is no associated threat in
this example, thus absorption is possible via pilot error or by catastrophic failure of the
aircraft. The aircraft is capable of being in one of the following states:
• State 0--UP AWAITING MISSION: The aircraft is on the flightline in an up sta-
tus, pending mission assignment.
• State 1-INBOUND TO LZ: With a resupply mission assigned, the aircraft now
travels via an inbound route to an LZ. Speed of the aircraft and distance to the
LZ determine travel times. From State 1 it is possible the aircraft lands at an LZ,
or aborts the mission thus transitioning to State 3.
• State 2--IN LZ CONDUCTING RESUPPLY: The aircraft has landed in an LZ to
discharge passengers or equipment. This unloading of passengers or equipment is
expected to take approximately three minutes. From State 2 it is possible to tran-
sition to State 1, if flying to another LZ, or to to State 3 if flying back to base.
• State 3—EGRESS: Departure from the LZ or inbound state to return to base, the
aircraft may now transition to travel to another zone (State 1) or continue to return
to base, (State 0).
• State 4--PILOT ERROR: The aircraft is lost due to an error in judgement by the
pilot.
• State 5-CATASTROPHIC FAILURE: The aircraft is lost due to a mechanical
failure.
The P matrix, Figure 1 reflects the probabilities of all possible transitions, State i to
State j, within this chain.
1
0.65 0.2 0.05 0.1
0.2 0.65 0.1 0.05
0.5 0.35 0.075 0.075
1
1
Figure 1. P matrix.
The T matrix, Figure 2, is made up of time, in hours, from entry into State i to
transition to State j. These times would reflect the expected values of their associatedfv
distributions; for development of the model these times are estimates derived by the au-
thor.
18
1.7 1.1 0.58 0.58
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
2 0.5 0.23 0.23
Figure 2. T matrix.
Using the P and T matrices, first step analysis is employed to answer the questions
of interest. If an absorbing state (States 4 or 5 in the example) is identified as State rl
or r2, then the probability of absorption in a particular state, r, given the initial state is




pir + Yf»m (2 - 2 )
J-Q
For the example, the probability of aircraft loss due to pilot error is found by solving for
the probability of absorption in State 4. This is accomplished by solving the following
set of simultaneous linear equations generated by the P matrix:
v(0) = + lv(l) + + 0+0+0
v(l) = + + .65v(2) + .2v(3) + .05 +0
v(2) = + .2v(l) + + .65v(3) + .1 +0
v(3) = .5v(0) + .35v(l) + + + .075 +
This set of equations is easily solved using APL, and the output from a function utilizing
the example's T matrix generates the display given in Figure 3.












Figure 3. Probability of absorption in a particular state.
Thus, in the current example, the probability an aircraft is lost due to pilot error (State
4), given that it starts awaiting a mission (State 0), is 0.4743307664. Likewise, given that
an aircraft is inbound to the landing zone (State 1), the probability that it will be lost
due to catastrophic failure of the airframe (State 5), is 0.5256692336.
Regardless of how the aircraft is ultimately lost, a determining measure of how
successful or unsuccessful a particular weapon system performs is based on howr long it
is able to survive. Attrition information is conveniently generated from first step analysis
by solving for mean time to absorption. For any transient state, i, the mean time to
absorption, m(i), is computed using equation (2.3) in which fsF^ds) is the mean wait
time in state i when going to state j [Ref. 3: p. 83].
PJ sFy(ds)+\Pyl\ sF^ds) + m(/)] (2.3)
£[S,]
,
the expected sojourn time in state i, is obtained using equation (2.4).
N£[S«] - y.P9 \sFf/(4s) (2.4)
7=0
J
Equation (2.3) can be rewritten as
r-l
m{i) = £[S,.] + YjW) (2 -5)
7=0
In applying this concept to the example, the P and T matrices formulate the set of
linear equations:
m(0) = + lm(l) + + + £[S ]
m(l) = + + .65m(2) + .2m(3) + £[S,]
m(2) = + .2m(l) + + .65m(3) + £[SJ
m(3) = .5m(0) + .35m(l) + + + £[S3]
The solution to these simultaneous equations, as generated by an APL function, is
presented in Figure 4. Referring to this figure, it may be seen that an aircraft is expected
to survive approximately 41 hours if it starts awaiting a mission to be assigned. Given
the aircraft is currently on a mission and is in the landing zone, it can expect to be
attrited in 24 hours.






Figure 4. Mean time to absorption (in hours) from a given state.
Although a key MOE may be attrition related, such as survival time, more specific
information reflecting the actual amount of work done within that survival time is of
even more interest. How much time was spent effectively accomplishing what? By de-
termining the number of times any particular state is visited prior to absorption, what
specifically can be accomplished may be answered. First step analysis is tailored to solve
for Wm the mean number of visits to state (k) prior to absorption, given the initial state
(i), in equation (2.8) [Ref. 3: p. 117].
T-\
lVik = 6 ik + Ypu W:k where 5U = \ ' J (2.8)l l j^ lJ J u (0 otherwise
Employing a matrix format as per equation (2.1), in which Q is the matrix of the
transient state transition probabilities, TAYLOR [Ref. 3: p. 118] develops the funda-
mental matrix, W, the matrix of all w
W={I-QT X
Given the aircraft starts in state i, the mean number of visits to state j prior to absorp-
tion is W,j. The fundamental matrix of the current example is given in Figure 5.
NUMBER OF VISITS TO STATE J FROM I BEFORE ABSORPTION
1.913091309 2.933626696 1.906857352 1.826182618
0.9130913091 2.933626696 1.906857352 1.826182618
1.01210121 2.207554089 2.434910158 2.02420242
1.276127613 2.493582692 1.62082875 2.552255226
Figure 5. Fundamental matrix.
For an aircraft that is initially flying outbound from theTanding zone, that aircraft can
expect to be in the inbound state 2.49 times. The ability to determine the number of
times an aircraft is able to get into the landing zone to resupply is now obtainable. By
incorporating the lift characteristics of a given weapon system (either the number of
passengers or pounds of equipment) a better estimate of a particular measure of effec-
tiveness is available.
The above calculations are for expected values conditioned on a specific initial state,
Y = y. One can obtain the unconditional expected values by "unconditioning" [Ref. 4:
p. 220]. For example, suppose the aircraft is initially in State with probability 0.3, or
in State 3 with probability 0.7, then the expectations in Figure 6 are generated.
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Hours the aircraft is expected to survive prior to absorption:
0.3(40.882) + 0.7(23.905) = 28.998
Expected number of visits prior to absorption
STATE STATE 1 STATE 2 STATE 3
1.28239824 2.425375871 2.276494316 1.96479648
Figure 6. Results based on probabilities associated with initial state.
As previously alluded to, by knowing specific state characteristics of the system, a
better measure of effectiveness is obtainable. If the example aircraft is known to be re-
supplying the landing zone, State 2, with passengers and it is capable of transporting 35
passengers at a time, then it is reasonable to estimate that it is capable of transporting
35 x E(number of visits to State 2). Therefore, the modeled aircraft can transport 35 x
2.276494316 = 79.677 passengers in the 28.998 hours it is expected to survive.
As has been demonstrated by the use of this small example, the employment of the
Semi-Markov chain and first step analysis in concert with a combat model application
is a valuable analysis tool. This model is capable of providing a myriad of information
easily transformable into quantiative MOEs. This simple, yet powerful concept will now
be expanded in order to model the Osprey versus Blackhawk combat sustainability.
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The concept developed and demonstrated in the previous chapter will now be ex-
panded to provide insight into the real problem: determine whether the V-22 is neces-
sary to support and sustain the Marine Corps operations in the mid-range period
1995-2010. This particular model focuses on subsequent operations ashore, following
an amphibious assault.
The basis for and most essential element of this model is the establishment of the
Markov chain. The development of the chain relies on the Markov assumption that the
future is conditionally independent of the past given the present state. Each state space
must be adequately defined to ensure that the desired combat process is accurately
modeled. The degree of model resolution is determined by the detail of state definitions.
The chain developed for this model reflects possible states one assault support aircraft
could possibly be in while supporting a Ground Combat Element during subsequent
operations ashore. This was accomplished by "walking through" the subject process step
by step and defining the states necessary to reflect the numerous interactions that de-
termine the effectiveness of an aircraft. The following is a listing of the specific states
represented.
State 0--AIRCRAFT UP AWAITING MISSION ASSIGNMENT
State 1-MISSION ARRIVES AWAITING AIRCRAFT
State 2--PREPARED ASSAULT MISSION ASSIGNED
State 3--PREPARED RESUPPLY MISSION ASSIGNED
State 4-PREPARED RECON MISSION ASSIGNED
State 5-IMMEDIATE SAR MISSION ASSIGNED
State 6-IMMEDIATE MEDEVAC MISSION ASSIGNED
State 7-IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCE MISSION ASSIGNED
State 8-1MM EDIATE EMERGENCY RESUPPLY ASSIGNED
State 9-LOAD PASSENGERS (PAX)
State 10-LOAD EQUIPMENT
State 11-TAKE OFF AIRFIELD
State 12-P1CK UP EXTERNAL LOAD
State 13-EXECUTE PRECAUTIONARY LANDING
State 14-INGRESS LOW LEVEL
State 15-1NGRESS CONTOUR
State 16-INGRESS NOE (NAP OF THE EARTH)
State 17-LAND LOW FUEL







State 24--HIT WITH NO DAMAGE
State 25-- HIT WITH DAMAGE
State 26-AIRCRAFT IN REPAIR
State 27-EMERGENCY LANDING
State 28-LAND IN LANDING ZONE (LZ)
State 29-UNLOAD PAX
State 30--UNLOAD EQUIP
State 31-DELIVER EXTERNAL LOAD
State 32-EGRESS NOE
State 33--EGRESS CONTOUR
State 34--EGRESS LOW LEVEL
State 35-LANDED AIRFIELD
State 36-REFUEL AIRCRAFT
State 37--HOLD FOR MISSION SUPPORT
State 38--ABORT MISSION
State 39-AIRCRAFT DOWN AWP (AWAITING PARTS)
State 40-AIRCRAFT DOWN AWM (AWAITING MAINTENANCE)
State 41-TAKEOFF FROM LZ
State 42--HIT WITH KILL AIRCRAFT LOSS
State 43--PILOT ERROR AIRCRAFT LOSS
State 44--CATASTROPHIC FAILURE AIRCRAFT LOSS
The specific values that are associated with the P and T matrices of this chain, for
any alternative, are dictated by METTW (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, weather).
METTW actually sets the constraints for a given scenario and a weapon's characteristics
determine the appropriate probability and time transition values. For example, given the
threat, with no terrain or weather limitations, the increased range and airspeed of the
V-22 could enable it to take a route which would avoid threats to which the H-60 would
be exposed. A greater lift capability can be translated into fewer exposures for the same
lift mission. Based on the author's aviation experience, V-22 and H-60 characteristics,
and the USMC Assault Support Manual [Ref. 5], P and T matrices for the alternatives
have been created (see Appendix A). In Appendix A, State is associated with Row 1,
State 1 is associated with Row 2, etc. These are considered base case matrices in that
modifications will be made to them to conduct various sensitivity analyses. More ac-
curate data for these matrices could possibly be acquired from engineering data, histor-
ical data, expert judgement, or high resolution simulations (if they exist). However, for
the purpose of model development the current values are representative.
The goal of this model is to allow the decision maker to evaluate, using meaningful
MOEs, the effectiveness achieved by a particular alternative in a specific scenario. Cer-
tain weapon system configurations have been designated as in Figure 7. Based on the
proposed characteristics of the tilt-rotor relative to the conventional helicopter,
12
alternative base case matrices differ in ingress, egress, and detection transition probabil-
ities. The following initial state probabilities hold: the aircraft is initially inbound to the
LZ, flying low level (State 14) with probability 0.8 and the aircraft is on deck at the




Figure 7. Aircraft configurations.
As per the Combat Sustainability Model Directive [Ref. 1], particular MOEs have
been identified for consideration: sustainability, productivity of the assault support asset,
and the build-up of combat power. The reference fails to provide detailed definitions of
these MOEs; thus for the purpose of this analysis, the defmed measures of alternative
performance will represent the respective MOE.
• Sustainability. Represented by an alternative's expected time to absorption.
• Productivity. Represented by the expected number of passengers and pounds of
equipment transported prior to absorption.
• Build up of combat power. Represented by the number of passengers per hour de-
livered (the expected number of passengers transported divided by the expected
number of hours the aircraft survives).
Figure 8 shows partial output of the model from base case runs for the H-60 as well as
for the V-22. This output reflects the following expected values: the number of hours
the aircraft survived, the number of passengers transported, and the pounds of equip-
ment transported during that time. Additionally, the model generates the expected time,
in hours, the aircraft is in repair, awaiting maintenance (AWM) and awaiting parts
(AWP). These three values determine the "downtime" of the aircraft. The expected
number of passengers transported is determined by multiplying the expected number of
visits to the UNLOAD PAX state times the number of passengers the alternative is ca-
pable of carrying and likewise for the transport of equipment. The amount of time an
aircraft spends in a particular state is obtained by multiplying the expected number of
visits to the particular state times that state's sojurn time. Appendix B presents the APL
functions which provide this information and detailed model output. Information re-
garding an activity related to any specific state such as amount of fuel required, number
13
of emergency landings, the number of particular missions assigned, etc., would also be
obtainable from this model.
THE FOLLOWING EXPECTED VALUES HAVE BEEN DETERMINED












Figure 8. Base case model outputs.
An attribute of an analytical model is its transparency. Sensitivity analysis has been
conducted on three parameters: detection probability, survivability, and maintainability.
• Detection - The probability of an aircraft being detected during ingress and egress
states is varied.
• Survivability - The probability of damage to an aircraft which would require it to
land, given it has been shot at and hit, is varied.
• Maintainability - Repair time and time awaiting parts varies, as do the probabilities
associated with transitioning to repair, awaiting maintenance, and awaiting parts
states.
By incorporating the enhanced maintenance and survivability cases with reduced prob-
ability of detection, an upper estimate of performance run was made for each alternative.
Likewise a lower estimate was achieved by combining degraded maintainability and
survivability with an increased probability of detection condition. The following chapter
examines each alternative's performance relative to the various MOEs, as well as iden-
tifying the impact resulting from varying different parameters using sensitivity analysis.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The airland warfare process is complex. Predictions of combat results from any
model are dependent on numerous factors such as METTW, and their interactions. Ex-
perimentally verified data associated with the combat process does not exist in reality,
therefore a point estimate alone should not be presented to a decision maker for an
evaluation [Ref. 6: p. 76]. Analytical models can be used to gain insight and to answer
"what would happen if questions and are also capable of identifying factors that are
important as well as those that are not.
Sensitivity analysis has been performed on the base case of each alternative with
respect to detection probability, survivability, and maintainability. By modifying the
base case P and T matrices for each alternative, the following model runs have been
formulated.
• MAINT(4-): Decreases the probability of transition to AWM, AWP states, in-
creasing the probability of transition to aircraft in repair. Decreases time associated
with AWM, AWP and aircraft in repair states. Following a precautionary landing,
the probability of requiring repair decreases.
• MAINT(-): Increases the probability of transition to AWM, AWP states, decreas-
ing the probability of transition to aircraft in repair. Increases time associated with
AWM, AWP and aircraft in repair states. Following a precautionary landing, the
probability of requiring repair increases.
• SURV( + ): Increases the probability of no damage given a hit, decreasing proba-
bility of damage given a hit.
• SURV(-): Decreases the probability of no damage given a hit, increasing probabil-
ity of damage given a hit.
• PDET( + ): Increases probability of detection from ingress and egress states, de-
creasing the probability of arrival at LZ and base.
• PDET(-): Decreases probability of detection from ingress and egress states, in-
creasing the probability of arrival at LZ and base.
• LOWER ESTIMATE: Combines MAINT(-), SURV(-), and PDET( + ) adjust-
ments.
• UPPER ESTIMATE: Combines MAINT(+ ), SURV( + ), and PDET(-) adjust-
ments.
Appendix C lists the functions which assign the the specific values resulting in the asso-
ciated improvement and degredation of the respective parameters. Tables 1 and 2 sum-
marize the results for the H-60 and V-22, respectively. These results reflect the following
15
expected values: the number of hours the aircraft survives, the number of passengers
transported, the amount of equipment transported (thousands of pounds), the amount
of downtime and the rate (passengers per hour) delivered.















360.8 125.1 70.9 47.1 .35
MAINT(+ ) 319.2 124.8 70.7 21.8 .39
MAINT(-) 455.8 125.6 71.2 109.1 .28
SURV( + ) 323.0 124.0 70.2 34.5 .38
SURV(-) 397.2 126.2 71.5 58.1 .32
PDET(+) 214.0 61.7 35.0 38.3 .29








463.1 184.2 104.4 21.2 .40
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412.9 275.9 124.1 49.3 .67
MAINT( + ) 368.4 275.4 123.9 22.3 .75
MAINT(-) 514.4 277.1 124.6 114.4 .54
SURV( + ) 378.0 273.5 123.0 38.7 .72
SURV(-) 446.5 278.3 125.2 59.2 .62
PDET( + ) 234.7 134.5 60.5 39.2 .57








491.1 368.5 165.8 21.3 .75
Information presented in these tables allows the decision maker to determine po-
tential trade-ofTs. He or she can now identify which parameters are important and also
determine which data are important and which are not. Sensitivity analysis also shows
which MOEs are most sensitive to which parameters. The following are several specific
comparisons of results provided to illustrate the scope of the analyses possible.
Figure 9 reflects the lower and upper estimates of alternative effectiveness, showing
how very well or how poorly an alternative is capable of performing. As displayed by the
sustainability graph, in the lower estimate case an aircraft survives fewer hours. More
significantly the downtime associated with this case accounts for approximately 32% of
the total survival time. The upper estimate reflects an improvement in sustainability and
a reduction in downtime. This reduced downtime accounts for less than five percent of
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Figure 9. H-60 vs.V-22 Boundary Case Comparison.
The rate of passenger transport graph similarly reflects the range of performance
which can be expected by each alternative. In viewing the rate graph in Figure 9, it can
be seen that with the H-60 at its upper estimate and the V-22 at its lower estimate, the
Blackhawk rate of passenger delivery actually exceeds that of the Osprey.
The probability of detection for a given scenario has the greatest impact on what
can potentially be accomplished. Figure 10 shows a significant difference in the number
of hours an aircraft is expected to survive between low and high probability of detection
cases. Referring to Table 1, the Blackhawk is three times more productive when the
probability of detection is low than when high. If it were possible to somehow decrease
the probability of detection for the H-60, by lowering its infrared signature, decreasing
its noise, or increasing its range, the Blackhawk could potentially transport approxi-
mately 186 passengers. Even with this marked H-60 improvement the Blackhawk would
still transport 90 fewer passengers than the Osprey in its V-22 base case.
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Figure 10. H-60 vs. V-22 Sensitivity to Probability of Detection.
As seen in Figure 11, the degraded maintenance case yields the greatest survival
time. What is also shown by the sustainability graph is that approximately 23% of that
time is downtime. Following a precautionary landing, the probability that significant
maintenance is required decreases as the maintainability of the aircraft improves. The
more time an aircraft spends in maintenance, the less time it is available to actually
perform its mission and be subject to attrition. The sustainability graph additionally
shows that as the maintenance improves, both the total survival time and downtime
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Figure 11. H-60 vs. V-22 Sensitivity to Maintainability.
The associated rate of passenger transport clearly reflects the results of increased
maintainability. Referring to Table 2, the V-22 experiences a .21 passenger per hour
difference within maintenance levels. Comparing the degraded maintenance case of the
V-22 with the improved maintenance case of the H-60 (see Tables 1 and 2) the Osprey
with twice the load carrying capability of the H-60 is only able to deliver "combat power"
.15 passengers per hour better than the Blackhawk.
Improving the survivability of an aircraft results in its ability to tolerate more dam-
age before being required to execute an emergency landing. Figure 12 shows as
survivability increases, the sustainability (number of hours the aircraft survives) de-
creases. The more survivable the aircraft the less time it is associated with maintenance
and the greater the time it is exposed to the threat. Although the aircraft survives less
time, as the survivability improves, the downtime decreases from 15% to 10% of the
total time. This translates into an improved rate of passenger transport as seen by the
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Figure 12. H-60 vs. V-22 Sensitivity to Survivability.
Based on the results of this analysis the V-22 provides better combat effectiveness
than the H-60, in the majority of cases. The "how much better" is available for this
particular scenario and is easily obtainable for any additional cases. This analysis also
shows that there may be a combination of conditions with various MOEs where the
H-60 is more effective. Comparing a squadron of 22 H-60s with a squadron of 1 1 V-22s,
and applying the expected number of passengers transported per aircraft for each base
case even more information can be obtained. By multiplying the number of aircraft
available by the expected value, it can be determined that when the H-60 squadron loses
four aircraft it is expected to transport 2252 passengers. However, when the V-22
squadron loses three aircraft its expected capability is reduced to 2207 passengers, and
the loss of a fourth V-22 further reduces this to 1931 passengers.
The number of available comparisons of MOEs with varying parameters is exten-
sive. The goal of the model is to present the decision maker with the information nec-
essary to gain insight into the specific combat process and the performance of the
21
specific alternatives being considered. The decision maker now has available additional
information which may be incorporated with a myriad of other factors such as the
number of aircraft available, cost considerations, timeliness of delivery, etc. to determine
if the V-22 is "necessary" for the Marine Corps.
22
V. SUMMARY
The Marine Corps must find a replacement for the CH-46 assault support aircraft.
Alternatives currently being considered are the H-60 Blackhawk and the V-22 Osprey.
Having specified several MOEs including sustainability, productivity, and the ability to
build up combat power, a study directive was initiated to determine whether the V-22 is
"necessary" to support the Marine Corps in the 1995-2010 timeframe.
To provide insight into this problem, this thesis presents the development and im-
plementation of a Markov chain analytical model. Runs were made to obtain a base
case, as well as upper and lower performance estimates of the subject MOEs for each
alternative. Additionally, sensitivity analysis was conducted on the parameters of main-
tainability, survivability and detection probability. The results of the analysis have
identified shortcomings of various MOEs, reflected the sensitivity of the MOEs to dif-
ferent parameters, and given values of "how much better" one alternative is over the
other for a given case.
By simply applying the results of this analysis, the greater capability possessed by
the V-22 translates into better performance in the selected MOEs. In order to determine
the necessity of the V-22 other factors need to be considered. The number of H-60s
available could be twice the number of V-22s. Additional airframes afford the
commander added flexibility. Also it must be determined how much of the total force
capability is lost when one aircraft is attrited. This analysis allows the decision maker to
gain an appreciation for what would happen if the proposed V-22 is unable to achieve
its desired characteristics, and to see the results of potential trade-offs which could result
in improved maintenance or survivability of the existing H-60. Due to the complex and
dynamic nature of the combat process, neither one model nor analysis alone is able to
determine the necessity of the V-22. Time of delivery, cost, and politics are other vari-
ables this analysis was unable to model; ultimately these factors will influence the de-
termination of the eventual replacement for the CH-46.
The modeling technique developed for this analysis has extensive potential. In
considering the modeling of flights of more than one aircraft, different transition matri-
ces would be required to reflect such factors as the effect on maintenance, probability
of detection, probability of hit, and expected number of sorties required. The charac-
teristics of numerous threats may be incorporated as well. The significance of a
23
particular threat is determined by the probability of absorption by that threat for a given
initial state. Analysis of tactics could be conducted to see if different initial conditions
result in significantly different outcomes. Markov chains can be established for any Unit:
infantry, artillery or armor. For any scenario, absorption could be determined for vari-
ous thresholds, sensitivity conducted on numerous parameters including initial states,
and representative MOEs evaluated. The robustness and transparency of this model are
well suited for this type analysis. The degree of resolution is directly related to the degree
in which the applicable Markov states are defined. As with any model the validity of the
data will significantly impact on the validity of the model.
Perhaps the greatest potential use of this type model is in its ability to provide the
framework for the incorporation of other combat models. Any combat process can be
developed in the Markov chain structure from the platoon level to the division level. In
such a framework, high resolution results could be integrated into the transition matrices
of higher level processes and evaluated.
It is hoped that the analysis of the air assault support combat process contained in
this thesis will prove beneficial to weapons systems analysts. Conducting thorough and
thought provoking analyses have proven an integral part of the weapon system acquisi-
tion process which hopefully results in obtaining the most effective system for the
money. Today's Marine Corps continues to do more with less, and quality analysis is
an essential element necessary to ensure that this characteristic remains true in the fu-
ture.
24
APPENDIX A. STATES OF THE MARKOV CHAIN
This appendix contains a listing of Markov chain states developed for the assault
support aircraft combat sustainability model. Following the state listing are the proba-
bility transition matrix
,
P matrix, and the time transition matrix, T matrix, for the H-60
base case and Appendix C contains the APL function which transforms the H-60 base








































e 0--AIRCRAFT UP AWAITING MISSION ASSIGNMENT
e 1-MISSION ARRIVES AWAITING AIRCRAFT
e 2--PREPARED ASSAULT MISSION ASSIGNED
e 3--PREPARED RESUPPLY MISSION ASSIGNED
e 4--PREPARED RECON MISSION ASSIGNED
e 5-IMMEDIATE SAR MISSION ASSIGNED
e 6-IMMEDIATE MEDEVAC MISSION ASSIGNED
e 7-1M MEDIATE REACTION FORCE MISSION ASSIGNED
e 8--IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY RESUPPLY ASSIGNED
e 9-LOAD PASSENGERS (PAX)
e 10--LOAD EQUIPMENT
e 11-TAKE OFF AIRFIELD
e 12-PICK UP EXTERNAL LOAD
e 13-EXECUTE PRECAUTIONARY LANDING
e 14-INGRESS LOW LEVEL
e 15-INGRESS CONTOUR
e 16-INGRESS NOE (NAP OF THE EARTH)
e 17-LAND LOW FUEL






e 24-HIT WITH NO DAMAGE
e 25- HIT WITH DAMAGE
e 26-AIRCRAFT IN REPAIR
e 27-EMERGENCY LANDING
e 28-LAND IN LANDING ZONE (LZ)
e 29-UNLOAD PAX
e 30-UNLOAD EQUIP
e 31-DELIVER EXTERNAL LOAD
e 32-EGRESS NOE
e 33-EGRESS CONTOUR
e 34-EGRESS LOW LEVEL
e 35-LANDED AIRFIELD
e 36-REFUEL AIRCRAFT
e 37-HOLD FOR MISSION SUPPORT
e 38-ABORT MISSION
25
State 39--AIRCRAFT DOWN AWP (AWAITING PARTS)
State 40--AIRCRAFT DOWN AWM (AWAITING MAINTENANCE)
State 41-TAKEOFF FROM LZ
State 42--HIT WITH KILL AIRCRAFT LOSS
State 43--PILOT ERROR AIRCRAFT LOSS
State 44--CATASTROPHIC FAILURE AIRCRAFT LOSS
H-60 BASE CASE
P MATRIX (45X45)






0.2222222222 0. 1666666667 0. 1666666667 0. 1



































































































0.3 0. 3 0.28
0.006
0.09 0. 002 0. 002
0.02 0. 15 0. 15





0.002 0. 01 0.01







0.002 0. 002 0.002
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0. 15 0. 15
0. 3 0.3
0. 006


























0. 002 0. 002
0. 04
0. 04 0. 29
0. 01 0. 02 0.59
0. 006








0. 002 0. 002
ROW 36
0. 18
0. 16 0. 16
0. 16 0. 16
0. 17 0. 006





























STATE IS ROW 1, STATE 1 IS ROW 2, ...
ROW 1
18 18









































0.05 0.03333333333 0. 08333333333 0.08333333333
0.08333333333















































0. 03333333333 0. 03333333333
0. 01666666667






































0. 3333333333 0. 008333333333 0.008333333333






0. 3333333333 0. 008333333333 0.008333333333
0.008333333333 0. 3333333333 0. 008333333333 0.008333333333
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APPENDIX B. ANALYTICAL MODEL AND SAMPLE RESULTS
The two programs listed in this appendix model the combat sustainability of an as-
sault support aircraft. By employing first step analysis on a finite state Markov chain the
function PABIG determines the probability of absorption by a specific state given an
initial state. The function TMBGABS determines the expected time to absorption and
the expected number of visits to a given transient state prior to absorption. These values
are then transformed into measures of performance. The listing of each function is fol-
lowed by a sample output for the H-60 base case. (State is Row 1, State 1 is Row 2,
...
,
when referring to the matrices.)
VPABIGLU1V
- PABIG P;ABSn2;ABSn3;ABSn^iB;C;DiA;AA
-1- STAKES THE TRANSITION MATRIX OF A FINITE STATE MARKOV
-2- p CHAIN AND VIA FIRST STEP ANALYSIS PROVIDES PROB OF
-3- ^ABSORPTION IN ONE STATE CONDITIONED ON INITIAL STATE
-4- ftTHIS MODEL SOLVES THIS PROBLEM FOR A 4 5 STATE CHAIN
-5- ftWITH THREE ABSORBING STATES
[6] A+ 42 42 iP
[7] IDEN+ 42 42 pl,42p0
[8] AA+A-IDEN
[9] B+ 42 1 pP[;43]O 42 1 pP[;44]




Q+ 42 1 p0,i41
















































































































































































- P TMBGABS T\P\SOJ\A\AA\IDEN\TIMABS\SHOWH\VIZITS
-1- rFUNCTION USES TRANSITION AND TIME MATRICES ASSOCIATED
-2- nWITH A MARKOV CHAIN, SOLVES MEAN TIME TO ABSORPTION
-3- aAND MEAN NUMBER OF VISITS TO TRANSIENT STATES PRIOR
[4] uTO ABSORPTION GIVEN THE INITIAL STATE,
[53 P+ 42 45 +P
[6] SOJ+ 42 1 p+/(Pxr)
[7] A+ 42 42 +P
[8] IDEN+ 42 42 pl,42p0
[93 AA+A-IDEN
[103 TIMABS+SOJEAA
[113 'MEAN TIME TO ABS '
[123 'FROM * IS
[133 Q+ 42 1 p0,i41




[183 a 1 NUMBER OF VISITS TO STATE J FROM I BEFORE ABS 1
[193 fl SAW
[203 'THE FOLLOWING EXPECTED VALUES HAVE BEEN DETERMINED'
[213 ' '
-22- 'HOURS MH-SO TO SURVIVE »,*(+/ ((42 1 pPINTA)xTIMABS))
[233 ' '
[243 E+PINTA+.xWW
[253 'PAX TRANS ,s(E[30]xl2
)
[263 'EQUIP TRANS INT ' ,* (E[313 x6300
)
[273 'TIME REPAIR ' , * (E[273 *S0J127 ; 3
)
48
[28] 'TIME AWM ' ,* (E[41] xSOJim ; ] )
[29] 'TIME AWP ,J5(E[40]x50 e7[40;] )
V
PBASE TMBGABS TBASE












































THE FOLLOWING EXPECTED VALUES HAVE BEEN DETERMINED
HOURS MH-60 EXPECTED TO SURVIVE 360.7788696
49
PAX TRANS 125.0755527





APPENDIX C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FUNCTIONS
The APL functions listed in this appendix reflect the specific values used in per-
forming the sensitivity analyses on the parameters of probability of detection,
survivability and maintainability. The H-60 functions are followed by the V-22 functions.
(State is Row 1, State 1 is Row 2, ... , when referring to the matrices.)
VHDETECTZU1V
V HDETECT P\PDET
^FUNCTION VARIES PDET IN INBOUND














PDETL3U; 361+19 5*5 00
PDETL35; 191+240*500
PDETL3 5; 361+20 5*500
HBAD+PDET













































































y HELO DETECTION PROB LOW '
51
[41] qv(+/PDET)




-1- uVARIES THE PROB DAMAGE TO A/C, HAVING BEEN





[7] <HELO SURVIVAL LOW
[8] r\*HSURVL22;l





[14] 'tfELtf SURVIVAL HIGH'
[15] R«J5ffS^i?7[22;]





V PP0B HMAINT TIME
r*VARIES PROB OF REQUIRING



























































































































flFUNCTION CONVERTS BASE CASE PROBS TO 722 BASE CASE































































































































































[4] '7-22 SURVIVAL LOW
[5] VBBAD+VSURV
[6] WSURV122;!




[II] '7-22 SURVIVAL HIGH'
[12] *VSURVl22il
[13] VGGOOD<rVSURV
[14] VSURV TMBVABS TBASE
V
VVMAINTLUIV
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